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Raising search costs to deter window shopping can increase profits and welfare

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  • Greg Taylor

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  • Greg Taylor, 2017. "Raising search costs to deter window shopping can increase profits and welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 387-408, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:48:y:2017:i:2:p:387-408
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/rand.2017.48.issue-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Chioveanu, Ioana, 2020. "A more general model of price complexity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Gamp, Tobias & Krähmer, Daniel, 2022. "Competition in Search Markets with Naive Consumers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 364, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Hämäläinen, Saara, 2022. "Multiproduct search obfuscation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Chioveanu, Ioana, 2019. "Prominence, complexity, and pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 551-582.
    5. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Deception and Competition in Search Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_014_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    6. Janssen, Aljoscha & Kasinger, Johannes, 2024. "Obfuscation and rational inattention," Other publications TiSEM b1b654a7-c163-4f68-9eb5-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Hämäläinen, Saara, 2018. "Competitive search obfuscation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 38-63.
    8. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Krähmer, 2022. "Competition in search markets with naive consumers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 356-385, June.
    9. Janssen, Aljoscha & Kasinger, Johannes, 2021. "Obfuscation and Rational Inattention in Digitalized Markets," Working Paper Series 1379, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Janssen, Aljoscha & Kasinger, Johannes, 2021. "Obfuscation and rational inattention in digitalized markets," SAFE Working Paper Series 306, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Chen, Yongmin, 2023. "Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 116609, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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