Search, bargaining, and signalling in the market for legal services
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DOI: 1756-2171.12012
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Cited by:
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Alexander Konovalov, 2014.
"Too much or too little? Price-discrimination in a market for credence goods,"
Working Papers
2014-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Konovalov, Alexander, 2014. "Too Much or Too Little? Price-Discrimination in a Market for Credence Goods," Working Papers in Economics 582, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2014.
- David Martimort & Jean‐Christophe Poudou & Wilfried Sand‐Zantman, 2010.
"Contracting For An Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 324-348, June.
- Martimort, D. & Poudou, J.-C. & Sand-Zantman, W., 2006. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2006.19, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- David Martimort & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2010. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00754443, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," IDEI Working Papers 448, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," TSE Working Papers 09-058, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014.
"The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2552-2566, August.
- Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, 2013. "The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 13-00001, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, 2014. "The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00002, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Julia Shamir & Noam Shamir, 2021. "Third-party funding in a sequential litigation process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 169-202, August.
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