Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution

This article examines the paradoxes of parliamentary reform. Focusing mainly on the House of Commons, the first section highlights the contradictory roles of parliament and utilizes a distinction between the ‘Whig’ and ‘Peelite’ conceptions of the Whitehall‐Westminster model to demonstrate the ambiguities and tensions that exist. This framework is then applied to a case study of parliamentary reform under Labour governments since 1997 in the second section. The third section emphasizes that parliament cannot be studied in isolation. It suggests that the British constitution is at a critical historical, political and institutional juncture in which a number of inter‐linked emerging agendas are altering the relationship between parliament and the executive. The significance of these emerging agendas is that, unlike internal reform of parliament, they are largely beyond the executive’s control. The combined influence of these factors is likely to impel the executive, at some point, to support a coherent and far‐reaching reappraisal of the structure, role and powers of parliament. Consequently the degree to which Britain (de facto) remains a parliamentary state will be subject to intense and increasing debate.