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Marching at the Pace of the Slowest: a Model of International Climate‐Change Negotiations

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  • Hugh Ward
  • Frank Grundig
  • Ethan R. Zorick

Abstract

We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto‐players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong bargaining position

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  • Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig & Ethan R. Zorick, 2001. "Marching at the Pace of the Slowest: a Model of International Climate‐Change Negotiations," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 49(3), pages 438-461, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:438-461
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00320
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
    2. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    3. Arild Underdal, 2012. "Strategies in international regime negotiations: reflecting background conditions or shaping outcomes?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 129-144, May.
    4. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
    5. Stine Aakre, 2016. "The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 145-159, February.
    6. Arild Underdal, 2013. "Meeting common environmental challenges: the co-evolution of policies and practices," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 15-30, March.
    7. Jon Hovi & Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig, 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 665-688, December.
    8. Jon Hovi & Tora Skodvin, 2017. "Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 5(2), pages 79-92.
    9. Benjamin Bagozzi, 2015. "The multifaceted nature of global climate change negotiations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 439-464, December.

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