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Models of Executive Politics: a Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi–presidential Regimes

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  • Robert Elgie

Abstract

The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country–specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross‐national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Elgie, 1997. "Models of Executive Politics: a Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi–presidential Regimes," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(2), pages 217-231, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:45:y:1997:i:2:p:217-231
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00077
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Ieraci, 2021. "Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 413-430, December.

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