Guns or Butter… or Elections? Understanding intertemporal and distributive dimensions of policy choice through the examination of budgetary tradeoffs at the local level

The level of spending for public services is known to be influenced by spending on other services. This interdependency is known in the literature in public budgeting and finance as budgetary tradeoffs. While it is well known that spending in one area affects spending in other areas, the factors that influence budgetary tradeoff decisions are not well understood, and specifically how intertemporal evaluation of funding influences budgetary tradeoffs is not currently addressed in the public budgeting and finance literature. Building on Jacob's theory of intertemporal policy choice, we develop a tradeoff model to test the key predictions of intertemporal policy choice theory. Using data from counties in North Carolina, we find that partisanship and time horizon generally influence budgetary tradeoffs in ways that are consistent with intertemporal policy choice. This research informs the budgetary tradeoff choices that are made at the local level, and it specifically informs the unique case of election administration spending. Our findings lend theoretical support to assertions that election administration is underfunded in the United States because the budgetary tradeoff models suggest that election administration suffers from not having a natural constituency to advocate for it in county governments and because the outcomes from funding or underfunding are only observed intermittently.