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The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto

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  • Thomas P. Lauth

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  • Thomas P. Lauth, 2016. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 26-49, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:36:y:2016:i:4:p:26-49
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Burton Abrams & William Dougan, 1986. "The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 101-116, January.
    2. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1988. "The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States," NBER Working Papers 2531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
    4. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1988. "The line item veto and public sector budgets : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 269-292, August.
    5. Alm, James & Evers, Mark, 1991. "The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 1-15, January.
    6. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
    7. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1990. "Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-19, April.
    8. Carter, John R & Schap, David, 1990. "Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-118, Spring.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:18:y:1924:i:04:p:782-791_10 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Indridi Indridason, 2011. "Executive veto power and credit claiming," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 375-394, March.
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