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Corruption in Public Procurement Market

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  • Tetsuro Mizoguchi
  • Nguyen Van Quyen

Abstract

The paper presents a model of public procurement in which the contracting officer is corrupt and extracts bribes from the bidding firms. The firms submit multidimensional bids, which consist of the quality and the price of the project that they propose to realize. The firms differ in their costs of realizing the project at a given quality, and these costs are private information. The contracting official, in exchange for a bribe, abuses the power of his or her public office by distorting the quality ranking of the bids and by giving the favoured firm an opportunity to readjust its bid to undercut its rivals. Our analysis suggests that when the firms serve only the internal market, the public project is realized at low quality and inflated prices. However, when the firms are also allowed to sell the product they develop for the internal market in a foreign market, the auction is ex post efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuro Mizoguchi & Nguyen Van Quyen, 2014. "Corruption in Public Procurement Market," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(5), pages 577-591, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:19:y:2014:i:5:p:577-591
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1468-0106.12084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2014. "Participation of Ordinary Investors and Stock Market Quality: A Comparison between Japanese and US Markets," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(5), pages 537-558, December.
    2. Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2019. "When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 205-236, September.

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