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Principal–Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation

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  • Yiyi Su
  • Dean Xu
  • Phillip H. Phan

Abstract

By examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal–principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999-2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal-principal conflict can lead to high agency costs.
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  • Yiyi Su & Dean Xu & Phillip H. Phan, 2008. "Principal–Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation," Management and Organization Review, The International Association for Chinese Management Research, vol. 4(1), pages 17-38, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:mgorev:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:17-38
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00090.x
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