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Ad Valorem Versus Per‐unit Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model

Author

Listed:
  • Judy Hsu
  • Longhua Liu
  • X. Henry Wang
  • Chenhang Zeng

Abstract

Ad valorem royalty licensing is implemented when the licensor (i.e., patent‐holding firm) obtains ownership shares in the licensee as payment once the new technology is transferred. In a Cournot duopoly model, we compare two licensing forms between competitors of different productivity, ad valorem and per‐unit royalty licensing. This paper finds that ad valorem royalty licensing is superior to per‐unit royalty licensing for the patent‐holding firm when the cost‐reducing innovation is non‐drastic. The reason for this result is that cross ownership reduces output market competition and thus the patent‐holding firm enjoys better profit margins by strategically setting the share ratio. Furthermore, we show that the relieved competition under ad valorem royalty licensing pulls down the industry output, and thus hurts consumer surplus and social welfare in comparison to per‐unit royalty licensing.

Suggested Citation

  • Judy Hsu & Longhua Liu & X. Henry Wang & Chenhang Zeng, 2019. "Ad Valorem Versus Per‐unit Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 87(6), pages 890-901, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:87:y:2019:i:6:p:890-901
    DOI: 10.1111/manc.12280
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Swapnendu Banerjee & Arijit Mukherjee & Sougata Poddar, 2023. "Optimal patent licensing—Two or three‐part tariff," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 624-648, June.
    2. Stefano Colombo & Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2021. "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1052-1073, October.
    3. Luca Sandrini, 2024. "Price Versus Market Share with Royalty Licensing: Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Technology with Heterogeneous Firms," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(2), pages 243-265, March.
    4. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2022. "Licensing in a Stackelberg industry, product differentiation, and welfare," MPRA Paper 114181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Masashi Umezawa, 2022. "Optimal two-part tariff licensing in a Stackelberg duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(2), pages 629-642.
    6. Luca Sandrini, 2023. "Price vs Market Share with Royalty Licensing: Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Technology with Heterogeneous Firms," Discussion Papers 2302, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    7. Hongkun Ma & Chenhang Zeng, 2022. "The effects of optimal cross holding in an asymmetric oligopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 1053-1066, October.
    8. Manel Antelo & Antonio Sampayo, 2024. "Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 142(2), pages 111-162, July.
    9. Jianxia Yang & Chenhang Zeng, 2021. "Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(4), pages 549-566, November.
    10. Leonard F. S. Wang & Arijit Mukherjee & Chenhang Zeng, 2020. "Does technology licensing matter for privatization?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1462-1480, September.

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