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Mixed Oligopoly, Product Differentiation And Competition For Public Transport Services

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  • PEDRO CANTOS‐SÁNCHEZ
  • RAFAEL MONER‐COLONQUES

Abstract

This paper explores frequency and pricing decisions in a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly when there is competition between means of transport and where one of the firms need not necessarily maximize profits. The private and the mixed duopoly are compared and distortions from the social optimum are identified, both analytically and numerically. A mixed duopoly does not recover the socially optimal solution. However, the presence of a (public) non‐profit maximizing operator is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. When both operators are (private) profit maximizers, some control measures such as price caps and minimum service availability would reduce the distortions from the social optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Cantos‐Sánchez & Rafael Moner‐Colonques, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly, Product Differentiation And Competition For Public Transport Services," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(3), pages 294-313, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:74:y:2006:i:3:p:294-313
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00494.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Kangsik Choi & Yuanzhu Lu, 2009. "A Model Of Endogenous Payoff Motives And Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 203-223, September.
    2. Benassi, Corrado & Castellani, Massimiliano & Mussoni, Maurizio, 2016. "Price equilibrium and willingness to pay in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 86-96.
    3. Feifei Qin & Xiaoning Zhang & Eoin Plant, 2017. "The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 593-618, July.
    4. Stefan Lutz & Mario Pezzino, 2010. "Mixed oligopoly, vertical product differentiation and fixed quality-dependent costs," ICER Working Papers 08-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    5. De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E., 2009. "Mixed oligopoly equilibria when firms' objectives are endogenous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 414-423, May.
    6. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Busygin, V. (Бусыгин, В.) & Popova, E.V. (Попова, Е.), 2016. "Development and Analysis of Strategies for Selecting Models of Mixed Market Participants [Разработка И Анализ Моделей Выбора Стратегий Участниками Смешанных Рынков]," Working Papers 3054, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    7. Fröidh, Oskar & Nelldal, Bo-Lennart, 2015. "The impact of market opening on the supply of interregional train services," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 189-200.
    8. Álvarez-SanJaime, Óscar & Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro & Moner-Colonques, Rafael & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J., 2015. "A model of internal and external competition in a High Speed Rail line," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 178-187.
    9. Stefan Lutz & Mario Pezzino, 2014. "Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(5), pages 596-619, September.

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