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Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels

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  • Lorenzo Pellegrini
  • Reyer Gerlagh

Abstract

A common finding of recent theoretical and empirical literature is that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth. In the paper, through growth regression analysis, we estimate the direct and indirect effects of corruption on economic growth. The indirect transmission channels, specifically investments, trade policy, schooling, and political stability, analysed in our study prove to be significant in explaining the deleterious effect of corruption on growth rates. We find that one standard deviation increase in the corruption index is associated with a decrease in investments of 2.46 per centage points, which in turn decreases economic growth by 0.34 per cent per year. The second, by importance, transmission channel is openness: a standard deviation increase in the corruption index is associated with a decrease of the openness index by 0.19, resulting in a decrease in economic growth by 0.30 percent per year. Jointly, the transmission channels explain 81 per cent of the effect of corruption on growth. While combating corruption is a long‐term task, an understanding of the transmission channels, through which corruption affects the economy, may suggest ways to limit corruption's negative, but indirect, effects on growth. Ein häufig zu findendes Resultat in der theoretischen und empirischen Literatur ist, dass Korruption eine negative Auswirkung auf das Wirtschaftswachstum hat. In diesem Essay schätzen wir anhand einer Regressionsanalyse die direkten und indirekten Einflüsse, welche die Korruption auf das Wachstum ausübt. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die indirekten Faktoren, die wir in unserer Studie analysieren, nämlich Investitionen, Handelspolitik, Ausbildung und politische Stabilität, auf signifikante Weise den mindernden Effekt erklären, den Korruption auf Wachstumsraten ausübt. Eine Erhöhung des Korruptionsindexes um eine Standardabweichung bewirkt eine Verringerung von Investitionen um 2.46 Prozentpunkte, was wiederum das Wirtschaftswachstum um 0.34% pro Jahr vermindert. Der zweitwichtigste Faktor ist der Grad der Offenheit einer Volkswirtschaft: Eine Erhöhung des Korruptionsindexes um eine Standardabweichung ist assoziiert mit einem Rückgang des Offenheitsindexes um 0.19 Prozentpunkte, was in einer Verringerung des Wirtschaftswachstums um 0.30% pro Jahr resultiert. Alle Faktoren zusammen erklären 81 Prozent des Effektes von Korruption auf das Wachstum einer Volkswirtschaft. Korruptionsbekämpfung ist eine langfristige Aufgabe. Ein gutes Verständnis der Transmissionskanäle, durch welche die Korruption die Wirtschaft beeinflusst, könnte dabei helfen, die negativen, wenngleich indirekten, Auswirkungen der Korruption auf das Wachstum einzuschränken. Un résultat partagéà la fois par la littérature théorique et empirique est que la corruption a un effet négatif sur la croissance économique. Dans cet article, nous estimons les effets directs et indirects de la corruption sur la croissance économique en appliquant une analyse par régression. Les canaux de transmissions indirects, notamment les investissements, la politique commerciale, l'éducation et la stabilité politique, analysés dans notre étude, s'avèrent être significatifs dans l'explication des effets nuisibles de la corruption sur le taux de croissance de l'économie. Nos estimations montrent qu'une augmentation de l'écart type de l'indice de corruption est associée à une diminution des investissements de 2.46%, ce qui à son tour entraîne une diminution de la croissance économique de 0.34% par an. Le second canal de transmission, par ordre d'importance, est le degré d'ouverture de l'économie: une augmentation de l'écart type de l'indice de corruption est associée à une diminution de 0.19 % de l'indice d'ouverture, résultant en une diminution de la croissance économique de 0.30% par an. Pris dans leur ensemble, les canaux de transmission expliquent 81% des effets de la corruption sur la croissance. La lutte contre la corruption étant un combat qui se conçoit sur le long terme, comprendre les canaux de transmission à travers lesquels la corruption affecte l'économie peut permettre de limiter ses effets négatifs, bien qu'indirects, sur la croissance.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2004. "Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 429-456, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:57:y:2004:i:3:p:429-456
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00261.x
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    1. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    3. Mr. Vito Tanzi & Mr. Hamid R Davoodi, 1997. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 1997/139, International Monetary Fund.
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