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State Buildng by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents

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  • Oliver Volckart

Abstract

Starting from the proposition that the feudal political system functioned as a market for military security where no territorial monopolies and consequently no states in the modern sense of the word existed, state formation is here explained as the outcome of efforts to restrict competition in this market. The explanation draws on the theory of regulation which focuses on bargaining between interest groups and political authorities as the cause of the creation of entry barriers to markets. Which interest groups and authorities were concerned in late medieval and early modern state building is analyzed on the basis of three historical cases, two of which led to the creation of territorial monopolies of security while in one instance corresponding efforts failed.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Volckart, 2000. "State Buildng by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 265-291, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:53:y:2000:i:3:p:265-291
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00121
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    Cited by:

    1. K. Kivanç Karaman & Sevket Pamuk, 2011. "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The interaction between domestic political economy and interstate competition," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 37, European Institute, LSE.
    2. David Dolejší, 2022. "Feudal bargain in Prague: The rise, spread, and fall of craft guilds," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(2), pages 237-267, May.
    3. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    4. Chilosi, David & Volckart, Oliver, 2010. "Books or bullion? Printing, mining and financial integration in Central Europe from the 1460s," Economic History Working Papers 28986, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.

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