IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/kyklos/v51y1998i1p3-24.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public Versus Private Provision of Altruism: Can Fiscal Policy Make Individuals ‘Better’ People?

Author

Listed:
  • Philip R. Jones
  • John G. Cullis
  • Alan Lewis

Abstract

SUMMARY Increasingly, commentators have argued that provision of welfare services is better left to the private sector, In the UK, the ‘Thatcher years’ were associated with a philosophy that greater decision making should be left to individuals and that, if state provision of welfare were ‘rolled back’, the voluntary charitable sector would become more active in meeting the needs of the disadvantaged. While ‘standard’ economic theory suggests that cutting public expenditure ‘crowds in’ private giving and that tax inducements to donate to charities can prove effective, there are reasons to dispute the proposition that such a mix of fiscal policy will cause individuals to behave more altruistically. An appraisal of public policy changes, which includes the impact of policy changes on individuals' preferences, calls in question the assertion that private charitable giving will provide an adequate substitute for public expenditure. The same analytical framework proves effective in predicting a range of policy outcomes. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG In zunehmendem Masse wird von Experten behauptet, die Bereitstellung von Wohlfdhrtseinrichtungen sei besser dem privaten Sektor zu überlassen. Die Thatcher‐Jahre in Grossbritannien waren mit der Philosophie verhunden, die Verantwortung vom Staat auf den Einzelnen zu verlagern. Zöge sich der Staat aus der Bereitstellung von Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen zurück, würde sich der karitative Sektor aktiver in die Versorgung Bedürftiger einschalten. Laut der ökonomischen Standardtheorie führen Kürzungen öffentlicher Ausgaben zu einem Anstieg privater Spenden und macht sich die steuerliche Absetzbarkeit von Spenden bezahlt. Die Annahme, dass dieser fiskalpolitische Mix zu einem altruistischeren Verhalten der Individuen führt, lässt sich allerdings aus mehreren Gründen hinterfragen. Eine Beurteilung eines Kurswechsels des öffentlichen Sektors, die die Auswirkungen auf die individuellen Präferenzen beinhaltet, stellt die Behauptung in Frage, dass private Spendengelder öffentliche Ausgaben in ausreichendem Masse ersetzen könnten. Der gleiche analytische Rahmen ist ein wirksames Instrument, um weitere politische Ergebnisse vorherzusagen. RÉSUMÉ De plus en plus souvent, les experts ont soutenu que les services sociaux devaient plutǒt ětre fournis par le secteur privé. Au Royaume Uni, les ‘années Thatcher’étaient associées avec une philosophie prévoyant une plus grand liberté de détcision laissée a l'individu et que, au cas où l'état reduisait la provision des services sociaux, les institutions charitables volontaires deviendraient plus actives pour satisfaire les besoins des ‘marginaux’. Tandis que la théorie economique normale suggère que les réductions des dépenses publiques font augmenter les contributions privées et que les encouragements fiscaux è contribuer è des institutions charitables peuvent se montrer efficaces, des raisons existent pourtant qui contestent le constat qu'une telle combinaison de politiques fiscales ménerait è un comportement individuel pluis altruiste. Une évaluation des changements dans la politique sociale, comprenant l'impacte de ces changements sur les pétférences des individus, met en question le constat que les contributions charitables privées remplacent convenablement les dépenses publiques. Le méme cadre analytique se montre efficace é la prévision d'une gamme d'issus de politique.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip R. Jones & John G. Cullis & Alan Lewis, 1998. "Public Versus Private Provision of Altruism: Can Fiscal Policy Make Individuals ‘Better’ People?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 3-24, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:51:y:1998:i:1:p:3-24
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00035
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-6435.00035?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lewis, Alan, 2010. "The credit crunch: Ideological, psychological and epistemological perspectives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 127-131, April.
    2. Orkhan ISMAYILOV, 2016. "Flypaper Nonprofits: Crowding In And Crowding Out Effects Of Grants On Nonprofit Finance," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(3), pages 77-87, December.
    3. P M Dawson & Philip Jones, 2010. "How are They Spending my Taxes? Tax Compliance and Citizens’ Interest in Politics," Department of Economics Working Papers 11/10, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    4. Jones, Philip & Dawson, Peter, 2007. "`Choice' in collective decision-making processes: Instrumental or expressive approval?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 102-117, February.
    5. Cheung, Chau-kiu & Lam, Ching-man & Ngai, Steven Sek-yum, 2008. "Help from the parent-teacher association to parenting efficacy: Beyond social status and informal social capital," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1134-1152, June.
    6. Andreas P. Kyriacou, 2010. "Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 823-839, April.
    7. Philip Jones & John Cullis, 2002. "Merit Want Status and Motivation: The Knight Meets the Self-Loving Butcher, Brewer, and Baker," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(2), pages 83-101, March.
    8. John Cullis & Philip Jones & Alan Lewis, 2007. "Tax Compliance: Social Norms, Culture and Endogeneity," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0722, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    9. Philip Jones, 2004. "‘All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(3), pages 450-468, October.
    10. Orkhan ISMAYILOV, 2016. "Flypaper Nonprofits: Crowding In And Crowding Out Effects Of Grants On Nonprofit Finance," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(3), pages 77-87, December.
    11. repec:eid:wpaper:11/10 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:51:y:1998:i:1:p:3-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.