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Voting on Social Security: The Family as Decision‐Making Unit

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  • FRIEDRICH BREYER
  • J.‐MATTHIAS GRAF V. D. SCHULENBURG**

Abstract

In periods of demographic change, pay‐as‐you‐go financed social security systems imply transfers of lifetime income not only among generational cohorts, but also between families of different size and generational composition. Whereas previous models of voting on social security in democratic societies focused on the first type of transfer and assumed homogeneity of interests within each generation, we treat the family as the relevant decision‐making unit. It is then analyzed how the results of majority voting on public pension and sickness funds depend on the rate of time preference, the overall rate of population growth and the distribution of children across families. Not surprisingly, opposition to mandatory social security turns out to be greatest when children are most unevenly distributed. In Zeiten demographischen Wandels ist mit einem umlagefinanzierten Sozialversicherungssystem eine Umverteilung von Lebenseinkommen nicht nur zwischen verschiedenen Generationen verbunden, sondern auch zwischen Familien unterschiedlicher Grösse und Zusammensetzung. In früheren Modellen der Abstimmung über obligatorische Sozialversicherung in demokratischen Gesellschaften wurde nur der erste Typ von Transfers betrachtet und Homogenität der Interessen innerhalb jeder Generation angenommen. Dagegen behandeln wir die Familie als die relevante Entscheidungseinheit und untersuchen dann, wie das Ergebnis einer Abstimmung über gesetzliche Alters‐ und Krankenversicherung von der Zeitpräferenzrate, der Wachstumsrate der Bevölkerung und der Verteilung der Kinder auf die Familien abhängt. Erwartungsgemäss ist die Opposition gegen obligatorische Sozialversicherung dann am stärksten, wenn die Kinderzahl besonders ungleich verteilt ist. En périodes de changements démographiques, les systèmes de sécurité sociale fondés sur le principe de la répartition impliquent des transferts de revenus (pendant la durée de vie) non seulement entre différentes générations, mais aussi entre families de taille et de composition différentes. A la différence des modeles précédents de vote en matière de sécurité sociale dans les sociétés démocratiques, centrés sur le premier type de transfert et faisant l'hypothèse d'une homogénéité d'intérȩts ȩ l'intérieur de chaque génération, nous traitons ici la famille comme l'entité décisionnelle de référence. Nous tentons alors d'analyser comment les résultats d'un vote ȩ la majorité sur les régimes publics de retraite et maladie dépendent respectivement du taux de préférence sur le temps, du taux de croissance de la population et de la distribution des enfants entre les families. Il n'est pas étonnant de trouver que l'opposition au système de sécurité sociale obligatoire est la plus forte lorsque la distribution du nombre d'enfants est la plus dispersée.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedrich Breyer & J.‐Matthias Graf V. D. Schulenburg**, 1987. "Voting on Social Security: The Family as Decision‐Making Unit," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 529-547, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:40:y:1987:i:4:p:529-547
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00788.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Breyer, Friedrich, 2001. "Why Funding is not a Solution to the "Social Security Crisis"," IZA Discussion Papers 328, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Kai A. Konrad & Gert Wagner, 2000. "Reform of the Public Pension System in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 200, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfram F. Richter, 2005. "Zur Berücksichtigung von Kindern bei umlagefinanzierter Alterssicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 115-130, February.
    4. Kruse, Agneta & Nyberg, Kristian, 2004. "Pensions and external effects of ageing; effects on distribution," Working Papers 2004:27, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    5. Breyer, Friedrich & Craig, Ben, 1997. "Voting on social security: Evidence from OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 705-724, December.
    6. Henning Bohn, 2009. "A Static Model for Voting on Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 2649, CESifo.

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