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The Impact Of Rent Controls In Non‐Walrasian Markets: An Agent‐Based Modeling Approach

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  • Ralph Bradburd
  • Stephen Sheppard
  • Joseph Bergeron
  • Eric Engler

Abstract

ABSTRACT We use agent‐based models to consider rent ceilings in non‐Walrasian housing markets, where bargaining between landlord and tenant leads to exchange at a range of prices. In the non‐Walrasian setting agents who would be extramarginal in the Walrasian setting frequently are successful in renting, and actually account for a significant share of the units rented. This has several implications. First, rent ceilings above the Walrasian equilibrium price (WEP) can affect the market outcome. Second, rent ceilings that reduce the number of units rented do not necessarily reduce total market surplus. Finally, the distributional impact of rent controls differs from the Walrasian setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Bradburd & Stephen Sheppard & Joseph Bergeron & Eric Engler, 2006. "The Impact Of Rent Controls In Non‐Walrasian Markets: An Agent‐Based Modeling Approach," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 455-491, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:46:y:2006:i:3:p:455-491
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9787.2006.00481.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Axtell, 2007. "What economic agents do: How cognition and interaction lead to emergence and complexity," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 20(2), pages 105-122, September.
    2. Bradburd, Ralph & Sheppard, Stephen & Bergeron, Joseph & Engler, Eric & Gee, Evan, 2005. "The distributional impact of housing discrimination in a non-Walrasian setting," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 61-91, June.
    3. John Mc Breen & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2011. "Information and Search on the Housing Market: An Agent-based Model," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1395, European Regional Science Association.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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