IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jregsc/v45y2005i4p851-864.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Hotelling Games with Three, Four, and More Players

Author

Listed:
  • Steffen Brenner

Abstract

. This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n‐player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation—as in the duopoly model—nor minimize differentiation—as in the multi‐firm game with linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players are characterized by a U‐shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations. Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentiation from the social perspective if n ≤ 3, while adding firms leads to a level of differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Brenner, 2005. "Hotelling Games with Three, Four, and More Players," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 851-864, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:45:y:2005:i:4:p:851-864
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00395.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00395.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00395.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:45:y:2005:i:4:p:851-864. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-4146 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.