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Games of Status

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  • Thomas Quint
  • Martin Shubik

Abstract

A status game is a cooperative game in which the outcomes are rank orderings of the players. They are a good model for certain situations in which players care about how their “status” compares with that of other players. We present several formal models within this class. Included are authoritarian status games (where coalitions may assign positions in the rank ordering to nonmembers) and oligarchic status games (where they are unableto do so). We consider the issues of a value concept for authoritarian games and that of core existence for oligarchic games. We then add a transferable resource to the models, obtaining “games of wealth and status.” Finally, we consider an interesting variant, called a “secession game,” where coalitions have the right to secede from the grand coalition and form their own smaller “subsocieties,” each with its own hierarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Games of Status," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 349-372, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:4:p:349-372
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00073
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    Cited by:

    1. John P. Conley & Fan‐Chin Kung, 2010. "Private Benefits, Warm Glow, and Reputation in the Free and Open Source Software Production Model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 665-689, August.
    2. Catherine C. Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Rick Wilson, 2010. "Cooperation and Status in Organizations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 737-762, August.

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