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Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers

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  • Jonathan H. Hamilton
  • Steven Slutsky

Abstract

Governments often divide operations into separate branches that face different constraints and have limited information. Such separation is feasible if each can operate by solving a simple optimization problem using limited information without requiring game‐theoretic calculations about others' actions. We specify two structures of one‐way information transfers that allow this. For each structure, we present conditions for unified and decentralized decision‐making to have identical outcomes. One of them corresponds to using a Samuelson aggregate welfare function that is not always fully efficient. We apply our results to several examples, including public goods and Ramsey pricing.

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  • Jonathan H. Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2000. "Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 289-318, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:289-318
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00040
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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2000. "Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation," Carleton Economic Papers 00-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2002.
    2. Jonathan H. Hamilton & Steven M. Slutsky, 2021. "Optimal domestic redistribution and multinational monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1031-1046, July.
    3. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Intriligator, Michael D. & Sheshinski, Eytan & Slutsky, Steven M., 2006. "Private information, Coasian bargaining, and the second welfare theorem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 871-895, May.

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