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Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development

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  • Niloy Bose
  • Richard Cothren
  • Nazanin Sedaghatkish

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that credit markets can catalyze property rights reforms. We illustrate this in a theoretical framework where a borrower must expend costly effort to protect output from predation. We consider two possible equilibrium loan contracts. In the first, lenders leave the decision to protect output to borrowers. In the second, lenders set the standard of property protection as a precondition for lending. The second contracting regime results in a higher level of property rights enforcement. Significantly, the level of economic development determines the equilibrium contracting form and vice versa. Based on this analysis, we jointly determine the evolution of property rights and economic development. The analysis also sheds light on the environments that lead an economy to a low development trap with a poor quality of property rights institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren & Nazanin Sedaghatkish, 2024. "Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(2), April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:26:y:2024:i:2:n:e12686
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12686
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