IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/joares/v44y2006i1p29-51.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports

Author

Listed:
  • ANNE BEYER
  • SRI S. SRIDHAR

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First, we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients, thus producing a stock price externality. Second, when the audit firm has limited wealth, an additional client can actually decrease the audit quality and increase the average likelihood of audit failure relative to a single‐client setting because of reporting externalities. Our analysis also demonstrates how requiring a more effective audit oversight mechanism can actually produce unintended consequences such as an increased likelihood of audit failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Beyer & Sri S. Sridhar, 2006. "Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 29-51, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:44:y:2006:i:1:p:29-51
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00197.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00197.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00197.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dye, Ronald A, 1993. "Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 887-914, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mingcherng Deng & Tong Lu & Dan A. Simunic & Minlei Ye, 2014. "Do Joint Audits Improve or Impair Audit Quality?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(5), pages 1029-1060, December.
    2. Somdutta Basu & Suraj Shekhar, 2021. "What's In A Name? Reputation and Monitoring in the Audit Market," Working Papers 60, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    3. Carlos Corona & Ramandeep S. Randhawa, 2010. "The Auditor's Slippery Slope: An Analysis of Reputational Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 924-937, June.
    4. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Smith, Deborah Drummond & Gleason, Kimberly C. & Kannan, Yezen H., 2021. "Auditor liability and excess cash holdings: Evidence from audit fees of foreign incorporated firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    2. Sebastian Kronenberger & Volker Laux, 2022. "Conservative Accounting, Audit Quality, and Litigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2349-2362, March.
    3. Karim Jamal, 2008. "Mandatory Audit of Financial Reporting: A Failed Strategy for Dealing with Fraud," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 97-110, May.
    4. Miglani, Seema & Ahmed, Kamran & Henry, Darren, 2015. "Voluntary corporate governance structure and financial distress: Evidence from Australia," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 18-30.
    5. Pan, Yue & Shroff, Nemit & Zhang, Pengdong, 2023. "The dark side of audit market competition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1).
    6. Lee, Hua & Lee, Hsien-Li & Wang, Chen-Chin, 2017. "Engagement partner specialization and corporate disclosure transparency," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 354-369.
    7. John M. Barrios, 2022. "Occupational Licensing and Accountant Quality: Evidence from the 150‐Hour Rule," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 3-43, March.
    8. Mahdi Salehi & Ali Mansoury, 2009. "Firm Size, Audit Regulation and Fraud Detection: Empirical Evidence from Iran," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 4(1), pages 5-19.
    9. Marco Pagano & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Corporate Fraud, Governance, and Auditing," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 109-133.
    10. Lennox, Clive & Li, Bing, 2012. "The consequences of protecting audit partners’ personal assets from the threat of liability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 154-173.
    11. Dennis M. O'Reilly, 2010. "Do investors perceive the going-concern opinion as useful for pricing stocks?," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 25(1), pages 4-16, February.
    12. Ray Ball, 2009. "Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 277-323, May.
    13. Sherry Fang Li & Sherry Fang Li, 2020. "Cost Of Debt And Auditor Choice," Accounting & Taxation, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 12(1), pages 35-44.
    14. Benoît Pigé, 2000. "Audit quality and Corporate governance : an analysis of French audit regulations [Qualité de l'audit et gouvernement d'entreprise : le rôle et les limites de la concurrence sur le marché de l'audit," Post-Print halshs-03425760, HAL.
    15. Moehrle, Stephen R. & Mohrman, Mary Beth & Reynolds-Moehrle, Jennifer A. & Stuerke, Pamela, 2009. "Developments in accounting regulation: A synthesis and annotated bibliography of evidence and commentary in the academic literature (1999–2000)," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 125-137.
    16. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Marleen Willekens & Dan Simunic, 2007. "Precision in auditing standards: effects on auditor and director liability and the supply and demand for audit services," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 217-232.
    18. Riyadh Jassim AL Abdullah & Mawih Kareem AL Ani, 2021. "The impacts of interaction of audit litigation and ownership structure on audit quality," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-14, December.
    19. Marcel Steller & Erich Pummerer, 2021. "Auditor’s Income Taxation and Audit Quality," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, August.
    20. Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi & How, Janice & Park, Jason & Verhoeven, Peter, 2018. "Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 307-320.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:44:y:2006:i:1:p:29-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-8456 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.