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The Determinants of the Amount of Information Disclosed about Corporate Restructurings

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  • Daniel A. Bens

Abstract

This paper examines the information voluntarily disclosed about corporate restructurings. In 1995 the FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force reached a consensus opinion about mandatory restructuring disclosures. I use these requirements to construct a statistic that measures the amount of information voluntarily disclosed for a sample of firms from 1990–1993. Disclosure levels increased dramatically when the SEC targeted restructurings as an area for increased oversight in late 1993. Controlling for this SEC action, I document a positive association between the amount of information disclosed and increased monitoring by shareholders, suggesting that monitoring complements disclosure rather than substitutes for it. The amount disclosed is negatively related to the appointment of a new CEO prior to the restructuring, perhaps reflecting the use of the restructuring charge to manage earnings for these firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel A. Bens, 2002. "The Determinants of the Amount of Information Disclosed about Corporate Restructurings," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 1-20, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:40:y:2002:i:1:p:1-20
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00036
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    Cited by:

    1. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    2. Jian Wang & Yanhuang Huang & Hongrui Feng & Xingjian Li & Shu Yan, 2023. "CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 975-1028, April.
    3. Schmidt, Marko & Grigoleit, Jens & Nippa, Michael, 2009. "Die Auswirkungen der Unternehmenstransparenz auf den Erfolg börsenorientierter Kapitalgesellschaften in Deutschland - Eine Darstellung des aktuellen Forschungsstandes," Freiberg Working Papers 2009/01, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    4. Nagar, Venky & Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2021. "Shareholder monitoring and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    5. Iatridis, George Emmanuel, 2011. "Accounting disclosures, accounting quality and conditional and unconditional conservatism," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 88-102, April.
    6. Kevin Mayo & George Ball & Alex Mills, 2022. "CEO Tenure and Recall Risk Management in the Consumer Products Industry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(2), pages 743-763, February.
    7. Sophie Audousset-Coulier, 2008. "Les déterminants de la publication volontaire des honoraires d'audit par les sociétés cotées françaises en 2002 et 2003," Post-Print halshs-00522305, HAL.
    8. Chen, Jean J. & Cheng, Xinsheng & Gong, Stephen X. & Tan, Youchao, 2014. "Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 18-32.
    9. Yun Lou, 2019. "Disclosure of Pending Lawsuits and Bond Terms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1926-1947, April.
    10. Michael Seamer, 2014. "Does Effective Corporate Facilitate Continuous Market Disclosure?," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 24(2), pages 111-126, June.
    11. Andrew Bird & Stephen A. Karolyi, 2016. "Do Institutional Investors Demand Public Disclosure?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3245-3277.
    12. Bing Wang & Si Xu & Kung-Cheng Ho & I-Ming Jiang & Hung-Yi Huang, 2019. "Information Disclosure Ranking, Industry Production Market Competition, and Mispricing: An Empirical Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, January.
    13. Ho, Kung-Cheng & Lee, Shih-Cheng & Pan, Lee-Hsien, 2024. "Information disclosure, product market competition and payout policy," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    14. Dorata, Nina T., 2009. "History repeats itself: The acquisition method and nonrecurring charges," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 11-26.
    15. Xu Cheng & Dongmin Kong & Xinwei Zheng & Qi Tang, 2022. "Do foreign investors crowd out sell‐side analysts? Evidence from China," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 815-834, November.

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