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Unobservable precision choices in financial reporting

Author

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  • Penno, M

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Penno, M, 1996. "Unobservable precision choices in financial reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 141-149.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:34:y:1996:i:1:p:141-149
    DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2491336
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toru Ishikawa, 2015. "The Relationships between Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures: Unobservable Precision Choices by Management," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 15-09, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Jonathan Glover & Carolyn B. Levine, 2019. "Information Asymmetries about Measurement Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 50-71, March.
    3. Hughes, J.S.John S. & Pae, Suil, 2004. "Voluntary disclosure of precision information," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 261-289, June.
    4. Aghamolla, Cyrus & Smith, Kevin, 2023. "Strategic complexity in disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
    5. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
    6. Hannu, Schadewitz, 1997. "Financial and nonfinancial information in interim reports: Determinants and implications," MPRA Paper 44292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Emeka T. Nwaeze, 2000. "Positive and Negative Earnings Surprises, Regulatory Climate, and Stock Returns," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 107-134, March.
    8. Klein, Olga & Klein, Daniel, 2024. "Institutional consensus after earnings announcements: Information or crowding?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PA).
    9. Glenn Feltham & Sean Robb & Ping Zhang, 2007. "Precision in Accounting Information, Financial Leverage and the Value of Equity," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(7‐8), pages 1099-1122, September.
    10. Robert Gox & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2010. "Optimal Precision of Accounting Information in Debt Financing," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 579-602.
    11. Mirko S. Heinle & Kevin C. Smith, 2017. "A theory of risk disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1459-1491, December.
    12. Antti Kanto & Hannu Schadewitz, 2003. "Impact of nonearnings disclosures on market risk: evidence with interim reports," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(10), pages 721-729.
    13. Dobler, Michael, 2008. "Incentives for risk reporting -- A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-206.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial reporting; Reporting accuracy; Uncertainty; Precision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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