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The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Of The Televison News Scheduling Game

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  • JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ
  • DIDIER LAUSSEL
  • MICHEL LE BRETON

Abstract

We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an extension of the "television news sheduling game" of Cancian, Bergstrom and Bills (1995) where viewers want to watch the first newscast broadcast after they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the newscast to watch them in case they are too late. At equilibrium, neither of the two stations broadcasts its evening news in the first part of the evening and the density function is strictly decreasing.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jean J. Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2008. "The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Of The Televison News Scheduling Game," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 418-418, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:418-418
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.05602001.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics," TSE Working Papers 13-405, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Dimitrios Xefteris & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2017. "Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 357-381, May.
    3. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Equilibria in unidirectional spatial models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 146-149.
    4. Dimitrios Xefteris & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzis, 2018. "Catalog Competition: Equilibrium Characterization and experimental evidence," Working Papers 2018/08, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    5. Carare, Octavian & Zentner, Alejandro, 2012. "Program substitutability in network television: Evidence from Argentina," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 145-160.
    6. Dimitrios Xefteris & Iván Barreda‐Tarrazona & Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2023. "Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 122-137, January.

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