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On the Consistency of Merger Policy

Author

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  • Tore Nilssen

Abstract

This paper presents a way to get around the information problem facing outside analysts who want to scrutinize competition authorities' decisions. A formal model of how decisions are taken is applied to infer information that is available to the authorities but not to the outside analyst. If the information thus inferred from several decisions is incompatible, it is claimed that the policy executed by the competition authorities is inconsistent. A case study is presented of two recent decisions by the Norwegian Competition Authority on proposed mergers in the Norwegian insurance industry, indicating they most likely were mutually inconsistent.

Suggested Citation

  • Tore Nilssen, 1997. "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 89-100, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:1:p:89-100
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00036
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    Cited by:

    1. Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November.
    2. Bergman, Mats A. & Jakobsson, Maria & Razo, Carlos, 2005. "An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 717-737, December.
    3. Brito, Duarte, 2005. "Should alternative mergers or acquisitions be considered by antitrust authorities?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 129-153, February.
    4. Joseph Clougherty, 2010. "Competition Policy Trends and Economic Growth: Cross-National Empirical Evidence," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 111-127.
    5. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2005. "Antitrust holdup source, cross‐national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 769-790, August.
    6. Jingang Zhao, 1998. "Non-Empty Core as a Precondition for Horizontal Merger: Core Existence without Using Balancedness," Working Papers 98-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Sunel Grimbeek & Steve Koch & Richard Grimbeek, 2013. "The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African Competition Commission," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 561-580, December.
    8. Eileen Fumagalli & Tore Nilssen, 2019. "Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 351-388, September.
    9. Richard J. Grimbeek & Sunel Grimbeek & Steven F. Koch, 2011. "The Consistency of Merger Decisions in a Developing Country: The South African Competition Commission," Working Papers 201117, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    10. Michael Reksulak, 2010. "Antitrust public choice(s)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 423-428, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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