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Untimely Entry

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  • Mills, David E

Abstract

Recent research indicates that when entrants incur set-up costs there is a tendency for oligopolistic industries to support too many firms. This is because incumbents accommodate entrants by reducing their output and making entry profitable beyond the point where it is socially efficient. The author shows here that set-up costs also distort the timing of entry and that entry dynamics inflate the social cost of excessive entry. Various approaches to regulating entry are evaluated and compared. Entry fees are shown to be superior to other methods in reducing the social cost of both excessive and untimely entry. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Mills, David E, 1991. "Untimely Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 659-670, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1991:i:6:p:659-70
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    Cited by:

    1. Argenziano, Rossella & Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp, 2013. "Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 509-512.
    2. repec:esx:essedp:741 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rossella Argenziano & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2014. "Clustering In N-Player Preemption Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 368-396, 04.

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