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Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

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  • ANDREA BURASCHI
  • ROBERT KOSOWSKI
  • WORRAWAT SRITRAKUL

Abstract

type="main"> Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option-like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund-value from the high-water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced-form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low-quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Buraschi & Robert Kosowski & Worrawat Sritrakul, 2014. "Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2819-2870, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:69:y:2014:i:6:p:2819-2870
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jofi.12167
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    Cited by:

    1. Scheckenbach, Isabel & Wimmer, Maximilian & Dorfleitner, Gregor, 2021. "The higher you fly, the harder you try not to fall: An analysis of the risk taking behavior in social trading," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 239-259.
    2. Ardia, David & Barras, Laurent & Gagliardini, Patrick & Scaillet, Olivier, 2024. "Is it alpha or beta? Decomposing hedge fund returns when models are misspecified," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    3. Mu, Congming & Yan, Jingzhou & Liang, Zhian, 2021. "Optimal risk taking under high-water mark contract with jump risk," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(C).
    4. Ewens, Michael & Gorbenko, Alexander & Korteweg, Arthur, 2022. "Venture capital contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 131-158.
    5. Yang, Tianna & Hou, Wenxuan, 2016. "Pay-performance sensitivity and risk-taking behaviors: Evidence from closed-end funds," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 274-288.
    6. Ahn, Dong-Hyun & Kim, Soohun & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2020. "Self-fulfilling arbitrages necessitate crash risk," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    7. Castañeda, Pablo & Reus, Lorenzo, 2019. "Suboptimal investment behavior and welfare costs: A simulation based approach," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 170-180.
    8. Sotes-Paladino, Juan & Zapatero, Fernando, 2022. "Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    9. Marcos Escobar-Anel & Vincent Höhn & Luis Seco & Rudi Zagst, 2018. "Optimal fee structures in hedge funds," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(7), pages 522-542, December.
    10. Andrea J. Heuson & Mark C. Hutchinson & Alok Kumar, 2020. "Predicting hedge fund performance when fund returns are skewed," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 877-896, December.
    11. Escobar-Anel, M. & Havrylenko, Y. & Zagst, R., 2020. "Optimal fees in hedge funds with first-loss compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    12. Arpit Gupta & Kunal Sachdeva, 2019. "Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance," NBER Working Papers 26113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Judy Qiu & Leilei Tang & Ingo Walter, 2018. "Hedge fund incentives, management commitment and survivorship," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 32(2), pages 115-142, May.
    14. Massimo Guidolin & Alexei Orlov, 2020. "Are Unconventional Monetary Policies a Priced Risk Factor for Hedge Fund Strategies?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20146, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Greg Filbeck & Timothy A. Krause & Lauren Reis, 2016. "Socially responsible investing in hedge funds," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(6), pages 408-421, October.
    16. Jory, Surendranath & Ngo, Thanh & Susnjara, Jurica, 2017. "The effect of shareholder activism on bondholders and stockholders," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 328-344.
    17. Flavio Angelini & Katia Colaneri & Stefano Herzel & Marco Nicolosi, 2021. "Implicit incentives for fund managers with partial information," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 539-561, October.
    18. Hugo E. Ramirez & Peter Duck & Paul V. Johnson & Sydney Howell, 2019. "Hedge-Fund Management With Liquidity Constraint," International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 22(06), pages 1-31, September.
    19. Zhao, Li & Huang, Wenli & Yang, Chen & Li, Shenghong, 2018. "Hedge fund leverage with stochastic market conditions," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 258-273.
    20. Andrea Buraschi & Paul Whelan, 2022. "Speculation, Sentiment, and Interest Rates," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2308-2329, March.
    21. Emilio Barucci & Daniele Marazzina & Elisa Mastrogiacomo, 2021. "Optimal investment strategies with a minimum performance constraint," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 215-239, April.
    22. Zhao, Li & Huang, Wenli & Ba, Shusong, 2018. "Optimal effort under high-water mark contracts," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 599-610.
    23. Emilio Barucci & Gaetano Bua & Daniele Marazzina, 2018. "On relative performance, remuneration and risk taking of asset managers," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 517-545, November.
    24. Koo, Minjae & Muslu, Volkan, 2023. "Fund Flows and Asset Valuations of Bond Mutual Funds: Effect of Side-by-Side Management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    25. Congming Mu & Jingzhou Yan & Jinqiang Yang, 2023. "Robust risk choice under high-water mark contract," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 295-322, July.

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