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Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing

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  • Eitan Goldman
  • Steve L. Slezak

Abstract

This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfolio of their predecessor. We show that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager's incentive to trade on long‐term information. This allows erroneous past information to persist, causing mispricing similar to a bubble. We investigate the magnitude of the mispricing. In addition, we examine endogenous information quality. In some cases, information quality increases when the manager's expected tenure decreases.

Suggested Citation

  • Eitan Goldman & Steve L. Slezak, 2003. "Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 283-311, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:1:p:283-311
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00525
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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin C. H. Chiang & Xiyu (Thomas) Zhou, 2009. "Do aggressive funds reallocate their portfolios aggressively?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 49(3), pages 481-503, September.
    2. Alexandre Garel & Arthur Petit-Romec, 2021. "Engaging Employees for the Long Run: Long-Term Investors and Employee-Related CSR," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 35-63, November.
    3. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    4. García, Diego & Vanden, Joel M., 2009. "Information acquisition and mutual funds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1965-1995, September.
    5. Cristina Cella & Andrew Ellul & Mariassunta Giannetti, 2013. "Investors' Horizons and the Amplification of Market Shocks," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(7), pages 1607-1648.
    6. Gary Gorton & Ping He & Lixin Huang, 2006. "Asset Prices When Agents are Marked-to-Market," NBER Working Papers 12075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo & Matos, Pedro, 2005. "Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 135-165, April.
    8. Peng, Hongfeng & Zhang, Zhenqi & Goodell, John W. & Li, Mingsheng, 2023. "Socially responsible investing: Is it for real or just for show?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    9. He, Eric & Jacob, Martin & Vashishtha, Rahul & Venkatachalam, Mohan, 2022. "Does differential taxation of short-term relative to long-term capital gains affect long-term investment?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1).
    10. Alda, Mercedes, 2017. "The relationship between pension funds and the stock market: Does the aging population of Europe affect it?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 83-97.
    11. Zeng, Yeqin, 2016. "Institutional investors: Arbitrageurs or rational trend chasers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 240-262.
    12. Goldman, Eitan & Strobl, Günter, 2013. "Large shareholder trading and the complexity of corporate investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 106-122.
    13. Paul Cox & Stephen Brammer & Andrew Millington, 2007. "Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(7‐8), pages 1307-1326, September.
    14. Roll, Richard W. & Cornell, Brad, 2004. "A Delegated Agent Asset-pricing model," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt9f06903n, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    15. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February.

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