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Risky Versus Riskless Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann‐Roth Controversy Revisited

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  • MARIA MONTERO
  • AKIRA OKADA

Abstract

In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A non‐cooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus/riskless) in the bargaining procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Montero & Akira Okada, 2007. "Risky Versus Riskless Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann‐Roth Controversy Revisited," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 294-302, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:58:y:2007:i:2:p:294-302
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00351.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.

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