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Extraneous Alternatives And Strategy‐Proofness

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  • Donald E. Campbell
  • Jerry S. Kelly

Abstract

It is well known that the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem cannot be circumvented by adding extraneous alternatives that are included in the individual preference information but are never selected. We generalize this by proving that, for any domain on which every strategy‐proof rule is dictatorial, the addition of extraneous alternatives will not permit the construction of a non‐dictatorial and strategy‐proof rule if the new domain is a product set. We show how this result, and our other theorem, can be applied to seven families of social choice situations, including those in which more than one alternative is selected.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "Extraneous Alternatives And Strategy‐Proofness," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 439-451, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:54:y:2003:i:4:p:439-451
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.t01-1-00069
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