IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v59y2021i4p822-838.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A House Divided against Itself. The Intra‐institutional Conflict about the Powers of the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Harmen Van der Veer
  • Simon Otjes

Abstract

Many authors suggest that MEPs seek to extend the power of the EP in their daily parliamentary work. A central assumption in this literature is that the EP is a unitary actor that desires more power for itself. In other words, scholars assume that the conflict over the power of the EP is inter‐institutional and not intra‐institutional. In this article we seek to test this idea. Informed by the history of the parliamentarization of Europe's national parliaments, we argue that the conflict about the power of the EP is likely to have an intra‐institutional component. An empirical analysis of voting in the EP supports this notion. We find that the question of how much power the EP should have is as important as the question of how much power the EU should have in understanding how MEPs vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Harmen Van der Veer & Simon Otjes, 2021. "A House Divided against Itself. The Intra‐institutional Conflict about the Powers of the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 822-838, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:822-838
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13133
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13133
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jcms.13133?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Earnshaw & David Judge, 1993. "The European Parliament and the Sweeteners Directive: From Footnote to Inter‐Institutional Conflict," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 103-116, March.
    2. Berthold Rittberger, 2014. "Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the Reform of Economic Governance in the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(6), pages 1174-1183, November.
    3. Giacomo Benedetto & Simon Hix, 2007. "Explaining the European Parliament’s gains in the EU Constitution," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 115-129, June.
    4. Berthold Rittberger, 2003. "The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 203-225, April.
    5. Andreas Maurer, 2003. "The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 227-247, April.
    6. Simon Hix, 2001. "Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 663-688, November.
    7. Hix, Simon, 2002. "Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 259-280, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:lic:licosd:28611 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Paul Schure & Amy Verdun, 2008. "Legislative Bargaining in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 459-486, December.
    3. Berthold Rittberger, 2014. "Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the Reform of Economic Governance in the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(6), pages 1174-1183, November.
    4. Berthold Rittberger, 2003. "Removing conceptual blinders: Under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ affect institutional design decisions?," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0023, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    5. Hae-Won Jun, 2003. "Catching the Runaway Bureaucracy in Brussels," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 421-445, December.
    6. Bart Stellinga, 2021. "The Rise and Stall of EU Macro‐Prudential Policy. An Empirical Analysis of Policy Conflicts over Financial Stability, Market Integration, and National Discretion," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(6), pages 1438-1457, November.
    7. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Konstantinos Matakos & Hande Mutlu-Eren, 2019. "“Take back control”? The effects of supranational integration on party-system polarization," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 297-333, June.
    8. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.
    9. Adam William Chalmers, 2014. "In over their heads: Public consultation, administrative capacity and legislative duration in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 595-613, December.
    10. Kyriaki Nanou & Galina Zapryanova & Fanni Toth, 2017. "An ever-closer union? Measuring the expansion and ideological content of European Union policy-making through an expert survey," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 678-693, December.
    11. Thomas König & Mirja Pöter, 2001. "Examining the EU Legislative Process," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(3), pages 329-351, October.
    12. Christophe Crombez & Simon Hix, 2011. "Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 291-314, September.
    13. Stefan Thierse, 2016. "Going on record: Revisiting the logic of roll-call vote requests in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 219-241, June.
    14. Torsten J. Selck, 2004. "On the Dimensionality of European Union Legislative Decision-Making," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 203-222, April.
    15. Gijs Jan Brandsma, 2015. "Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of informal trilogues in European Union lawmaking," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 300-319, June.
    16. Simon Hix & Abdul Noury & Gerard Roland, 2018. "Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 211-228, July.
    17. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2013. "Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 345-365, September.
    18. Yonatan Lupu, 2016. "Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but Not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(7), pages 1219-1250, October.
    19. Nikoleta Yordanova, 2009. "The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 253-280, June.
    20. Ripoll Servent, Ariadna and Amy Busby, 2013. "Introduction: Agency and influence inside the EU institutions," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 17, July.
    21. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i::p:811-833 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Robert Zbíral, 2015. "Standard Institution of the European Union? Changes to the European Council's Working Methods During the Financial Crisis [Standardní unijní instituce? Proměny vnitřního fungování Evropské rady na ," Současná Evropa, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(1), pages 4-18.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:822-838. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.