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The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts

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  • Takuya Iwasaki
  • Shota Otomasa
  • Atsushi Shiiba
  • Akinobu Shuto

Abstract

To test the implication of Watts’ (2003) argument that accounting conservatism increases the efficiency of executive compensation contracts, we investigate the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings‐based executive compensation contracts in Japanese firms. We focus on Japanese executive compensation practices because the demand for accounting conservatism is likely to be greater for Japanese than for US firms given the predominance of earnings‐based executive compensation contracts and relatively weak corporate governance of compensation contracts in Japan. We also investigate how the quality of the ex‐ante information environment affects the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings‐based executive compensation contracts. Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive relation between accounting conservatism and the compensation earnings coefficient. We also show that this positive relation is greater for firms with poor ex‐ante information environment. These results suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is greater for firms that use more earnings‐based executive compensation contracts and have more serious ex‐post settling‐up problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2018. "The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(9-10), pages 1139-1163, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:45:y:2018:i:9-10:p:1139-1163
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12350
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    Cited by:

    1. Khalifa, Mariem & Trabelsi, Samir & Matoussi, Hamadi, 2022. "Leverage, R&D expenditures, and accounting conservatism: Evidence from technology firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 285-304.
    2. Bigus, Jochen & Weicker, Marina, 2024. "Relationship banking and firms’ earnings quality – Does it matter whether banks are creditors or owners?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    3. Yoon K. Choi, 2020. "Does executive compensation reflect corporate productivity?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(7-8), pages 1012-1033, July.
    4. Jun Hu & Wenbin Long & Gary Gang Tian & Daifei (Troy) Yao, 2020. "CEOs’ experience of the Great Chinese Famine and accounting conservatism," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1089-1112, October.
    5. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
    6. Rui Wang, 2021. "The attention of long‐term institutional investors and timely loss recognition," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(9-10), pages 1596-1629, October.
    7. Qiang Cheng & Young Jun Cho & Jae B. Kim, 2021. "Managers’ pay duration and voluntary disclosures," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(7-8), pages 1332-1367, July.
    8. Hong Huang & Chang Liu & Yuqian He, 2023. "The Impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty on Executives’ Self-Interest Behaviors: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-24, January.

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