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Agency, Bid Resistance and the Market for Corporate Control

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  • Peter Holl
  • Dimitris Kyriazis

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the effects of post‐bid defence activity for a sample of takeover bids in the UK. We find that most of the defences investigated promote the interests of target managers by significantly lowering the probability of bid success. We also find that most of the defences promote the interests of shareholders by increasing wealth gains by an amount that varies between 9% and 14%. These results suggest that bid resistance is to the mutual benefit of the managers and shareholders of target firms. This conclusion is in line with recent developments in agency theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Holl & Dimitris Kyriazis, 1997. "Agency, Bid Resistance and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(7‐8), pages 1037-1066, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:24:y:1997:i:7-8:p:1037-1066
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.00150
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    Cited by:

    1. Pearce II, John A. & Robinson, Richard Jr., 2004. "Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 15-24.
    2. Caiazza, Stefano & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2016. "The determinants of failed takeovers in the banking sector: Deal or country characteristics?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(S), pages 92-103.
    3. Gerritsen, Dirk F. & Weitzel, Utz, 2017. "Security analyst target prices as reference point and takeover completion," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-14.
    4. Anna Bedford & Martin Bugeja & Matthew Grosse, 2021. "The choice of financial advisory and independent expert services in takeovers: evidence in a setting where the services are independent," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(2), pages 3649-3683, June.
    5. Henry, Darren, 2004. "Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of takeovers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 419-444, September.
    6. R. Abdul Rahman & R.J. Limmack, 2004. "Corporate Acquisitions and the Operating Performance of Malaysian Companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3‐4), pages 359-400, April.
    7. Krishnan Maheswaran & Sean Pinder, 2005. "Australian evidence on the determinants and impact of takeover resistance," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 45(4), pages 613-633, December.
    8. Sudarsanam, Sudi & Salami, Ayo & Alexandrou, George, 2002. "Rational expectations, analysts' forecasts of earnings and sources of value gains for takeover targets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 153-177, January.
    9. Darren Henry, 2005. "Directors’ Recommendations in Takeovers: An Agency and Governance Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1‐2), pages 129-159, January.
    10. Caiazza, Stefano & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2014. "The determinants of abandoned M&As in the banking sector," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp14074, University of Molise, Department of Economics.

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