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Banking Reforms for the 21st Century: A Perfectly Stable Banking System Based on Financial Innovations

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  • NAI‐FU CHEN

Abstract

Although bank loans themselves are somewhat illiquid because of private information, most of their cashflows are not. Recent financial innovations allow commercial loans to be liquefied via credit derivatives and actual and synthetic securitizations. The loan originating bank holds the remaining illiquid equity tranche containing the concentrated credit risk, private information rent and the ‘excess spread’ that incentivize the bank to continue to monitor and service the loans. Empirically, we find that the average size of the equity tranche is about 3% for the representative commercial loan portfolios in our sample. The liquefaction of bank loans makes possible a banking system that restricts the guaranteed accounts to be backed by 100% reserves and the non‐guaranteed deposits to be backed by liquid securitized loan tranches, while retaining the deposit‐lending synergy. Such a system is perfectly safe without deposit insurance and it renders banks bankruptcy‐remote without sacrificing a bank's traditional role as a financial intermediary.

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  • Nai‐Fu Chen, 2009. "Banking Reforms for the 21st Century: A Perfectly Stable Banking System Based on Financial Innovations," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 177-209, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:9:y:2009:i:3:p:177-209
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01089.x
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