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How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk‐Taking? Evidence from a Quasi‐Natural Experiment

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  • Pornsit Jiraporn
  • Sang Mook Lee

Abstract

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the effect of independent directors on corporate risk taking. To minimize endogeneity, we exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raises board independence. Our difference‐in‐difference estimates show that board independence diminishes risk‐taking significantly, as evidenced by the substantially lower volatility in the stock returns. In particular, board independence reduces total risk and idiosyncratic risk by 24.87% and 12.60%, respectively. The evidence is consistent with the notion that board independence represents an effective governance mechanism that prevents managers from taking excessive risk. Additional analysis based on propensity score matching also confirms our results. Our research design is based on a natural experiment and is far more likely to show causality, rather than merely an association.

Suggested Citation

  • Pornsit Jiraporn & Sang Mook Lee, 2018. "How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk‐Taking? Evidence from a Quasi‐Natural Experiment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 18(3), pages 507-519, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:18:y:2018:i:3:p:507-519
    DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12144
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abou-El-Sood, Heba, 2021. "Board gender diversity, power, and bank risk taking," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    2. Wongsinhirun, Nopparat & Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Lee, Sang Mook, 2024. "Customer concentration and shareholder litigation risk: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    3. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Treepongkaruna, Sirimon, 2021. "How do independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Caixe, Daniel Ferreira, 2022. "Corporate governance and investment sensitivity to policy uncertainty in Brazil," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PB).
    5. Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu & Camélia Turcu, 2022. "Productivity, financial performance, and corporate governance: evidence from Romanian R&D firms," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(51), pages 5956-5975, November.
    6. Baili Yang & Abraham Nahm & Zengji Song, 2022. "Succession, political resources, and innovation investments of family businesses: Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(2), pages 321-338, March.
    7. Bai, Min & Pan, Maomao, 2023. "The economic independence of supervisory boards and corporate innovation: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    8. Zeye Zhang & Liuyong Yang & Xuerong Peng & Zhongju Liao, 2023. "Overseas imprints reflected at home: returnee CEOs and corporate green innovation," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(4), pages 1328-1368, September.
    9. Min Jung Kang & Y. Han (Andy) Kim & Qunfeng Liao, 2020. "Do bankers on the board reduce crash risk?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(3), pages 684-723, June.
    10. Ongsakul, Viput & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2019. "How do independent directors view powerful executive risk-taking incentives? A quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    11. Chindasombatcharoen, Pongsapak & Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2023. "Corporate culture, cultural diversification, and independent directors: Evidence from earnings conference calls," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    12. Claudiu Tiberiu Albulescu & Matei Tămășilă & Ilie Mihai Tăucean, 2021. "The Nonlinear Relationship Between Firm Size and Growth in the Automotive Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 445-463, September.
    13. Henry Osahon Osazevbaru, 2021. "Conservative Business Strategy as Moderator of Board Independence and Corporate Performance Nexus in Nigerian Financial Companies," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 11(6), pages 446-456, June.
    14. Harris, Oneil & Nguyen, Trung, 2022. "Director co-option and future market share growth," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    15. Cheng, Lulu & Xie, En & Fang, Junyi & Mei, Nan, 2022. "Performance feedback and firms’ relative strategic emphasis: The moderating effects of board independence and media coverage," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 218-231.

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