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Abstract
This article explores how bargaining advantages arising from the process of public‐private coordination of interests enable local government to contain business influence in urban development. A theoretical framework highlights how the scope of business demands and the impact of policy on political coalitions empower local officials as Brokers, Organizers, Entrepreneurs and Promoters. Each role affords different pathways for state power in competition with business. This is illustrated by surveying transportation politics during the industrial age in New York City. The city’s experience demonstrates alternative local public‐sector foundations for governmental power in growth politics. As such, it qualifies theories of business privilege in democratic politics and identifies how the dynamics of the public sector empower local officials. Cet article examine comment la négociation d’avantages, née de la coordination des intérêts publics‐privés, permet à un gouvernement local de contenir l’influence des entreprises sur l’urbanisme. Un cadre théorique explique comment l’ampleur des demandes des entreprises et l’impact de la politique sur les coalitions politiques autorisent les représentants locaux à agir en Médiateur, Organisateur, Entrepreneur et Promoteur, chacun de ces rôles permettant des chemins différents vers le pouvoir étatique, en concurrence avec le monde des affaires. L’illustration est donnée par une étude de la politique des transports de la ville de New York à l’ère industrielle. Elle démontre que le secteur public local dispose de diverses assises pour s’assurer un pouvoir gouvernemental dans une politique de croissance. A cet égard, il modère les théories sur le privilège des entreprises dans une politique démocratique et définit comment la dynamique du secteur public donne un pouvoir aux représentants locaux.
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