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Rationality, strategic uncertainty, and belief diversity in non‐cooperative games

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  • Eduardo Zambrano

Abstract

I investigate the existence of epistemic models of complete information games that satisfy the following properties: players do not rule out their opponent's use of rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices; they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action profile that is ultimately played; and they do not rule out strategic uncertainty. In this paper I show that for a large class of games there are no epistemic models that satisfy these three properties.

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  • Eduardo Zambrano, 2018. "Rationality, strategic uncertainty, and belief diversity in non‐cooperative games," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 309-321, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:14:y:2018:i:4:p:309-321
    DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12161
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