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Golden Parachutes, Board and Committee Composition, and Shareholder Wealth

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  • Davidson, Wallace N, III
  • Pilger, Theodore
  • Szakmary, Andrew

Abstract

Takeover defense mechanisms have become common for many modern corporations. In this research, we examine one potential takeover defense mechanism, golden parachutes. In particular, the relationship between the board of directors (and the board committees) and the question of whether the parachutes are aligned with shareholder interests or are a means of entrenching management, is studied. Results show that the composition of the board of directors' compensation committee influences the market's perceived outcome of golden parachute adoption. When insiders and affiliated outsiders dominate the board's compensation committee, negative returns are more likely to occur than when independent outsiders control the committee. Copyright 1998 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Davidson, Wallace N, III & Pilger, Theodore & Szakmary, Andrew, 1998. "Golden Parachutes, Board and Committee Composition, and Shareholder Wealth," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 33(4), pages 17-32, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:33:y:1998:i:4:p:17-32
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    Cited by:

    1. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung-Seong Min & Richard Chung, 2016. "Corporate governance and dividend strategy: lessons from Australia," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(5), pages 583-610, October.
    2. Showkat Ahmad Busru & G. Shanmugasundaram & Shariq Ahmad Bhat, 2020. "Corporate Governance an Imperative for Stakeholders Protection: Evidence from Risk Management of Indian Listed Firms," Business Perspectives and Research, , vol. 8(2), pages 89-116, July.
    3. Tao, Ngoc Bich & Hutchinson, Marion, 2013. "Corporate governance and risk management: The role of risk management and compensation committees," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 83-99.
    4. Keldon Bauer, 2009. "Conflicts Of Interest On The Board Of Directors Of Non‐Profit Hospitals: Theory And Evidence," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 469-497, September.
    5. Smart, Scott B. & Zutter, Chad J., 2003. "Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of dual and single-class IPOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 85-110, July.
    6. Mohd Rashdan Sallehuddin & Nor Azrin Mohamad Rosli, 2019. "Corporate Governance and Performance: Evidence from Industrial Product and Service Sector in Bursa Malaysia," International Journal of Science and Business, IJSAB International, vol. 3(6), pages 87-98.
    7. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung S. Min & Imen Tebourbi & Mohammad Nourani, 2020. "Corporate Governance in Australia: Share Repurchases under an Imputation Tax System," Capital Markets Review, Malaysian Finance Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-23.
    8. Jocelyn Evans & Frank Hefner, 2009. "Business Ethics and the Decision to Adopt Golden Parachute Contracts: Empirical Evidence of Concern for All Stakeholders," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 86(1), pages 65-79, April.
    9. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    10. Maskara, Pankaj K. & Miller, Laura S., 2018. "Do golden parachutes matter? Evidence from firms that ultimately filed for bankruptcy," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 63-78.
    11. Khaleed Omair Alotaibi & Khaled Hussainey, 2016. "Determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and quality: Evidence from non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(4), pages 364-393, November.
    12. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Singh, Manohar & Lee, Chun I., 2009. "Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 819-828, May.
    13. M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, 2003. "The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-24, February.
    14. Xie, Biao & Davidson, Wallace III & DaDalt, Peter J., 2003. "Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 295-316, June.
    15. Borisova, Ginka & Brockman, Paul & Salas, Jesus M. & Zagorchev, Andrey, 2012. "Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2917-2934.

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