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Can online annual general meetings increase shareholders’ participation in corporate governance?

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Listed:
  • Huasheng Gao
  • Jun Huang
  • Tianshu Zhang

Abstract

We find that annual shareholder meetings conducted online can significantly increase the participation of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. This finding is more evident when the cost of physically attending the annual meeting is higher and when the firm's ownership is more dispersed. We further document significant positive stock returns when firms initiate annual online meetings. We also find that such online meetings help improve corporate governance. Overall, we provide evidence that online shareholder meetings provide shareholders a cost‐effective way to participate in governance issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Huasheng Gao & Jun Huang & Tianshu Zhang, 2020. "Can online annual general meetings increase shareholders’ participation in corporate governance?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 1029-1050, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:49:y:2020:i:4:p:1029-1050
    DOI: 10.1111/fima.12301
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    3. Lee, Eugenia Y. & Ha, Wonsuk, 2023. "Electronic voting in shareholder meetings and the market value of cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    4. Zoltán Csedő & József Magyari & Máté Zavarkó, 2022. "Dynamic Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Sustainability: Post-COVID Period," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-21, March.
    5. Feng, Yumei & Pan, Yuying & Ho, Kung-Cheng & Liu, Guanchun, 2023. "Corporate governance of weak stakeholders: Minority investors and investment efficiency," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    6. Vasiliy Andreevich Laptev & Daria Rinatovna Feyzrakhmanova, 2021. "Digitalization of Institutions of Corporate Law: Current Trends and Future Prospects," Laws, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-19, December.
    7. Ionascu Alina & Noja Gratiela Georgiana, 2024. "Analyzing Innovation through Bibliometrics: A Comparative Study of Sustainable Practices in Leading Economies," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 18(1), pages 2719-2732.
    8. Zhao, Yang, 2024. "Retail shareholder activism and investment efficiency," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    9. Li, Yi & Zhang, Wei & Wang, Pengfei, 2021. "Working online or offline: Which is more effective?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    10. Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing, 2023. "Minority shareholders' activism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    11. Cao, Qingzi & Fang, Ming & Pan, Yuying, 2022. "Minority shareholders protection and corporate financial leverage: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    12. Ning Cai & Wen He & Guoqiang Wu & Xin Yu, 2024. "Online voting and minority shareholder dissent: Evidence from China," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 327-352, June.
    13. Lee, Eugenia Y. & Ha, Wonsuk, 2022. "Electronic voting and strategic disclosure before shareholder meetings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    14. Lu, Qiaoshan & Xiang, Cheng & Li, Bingxiang & Feng, Lixuan, 2023. "Non-controlling shareholders' governance participation and corporate misconduct: Evidence from voting in general meetings," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    15. Shouyu Yao & Yuying Pan & Lu Wang & Ahmet Sensoy & Feiyang Cheng, 2023. "Building Eco-friendly Corporations: The Role of Minority Shareholders," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 182(4), pages 933-966, February.
    16. Lan, Ge & Li, Donghui & Yang, Shijie, 2023. "Costs of voting and firm performance: Evidence from RegTech adoption in Chinese listed firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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