IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/eufman/v9y2003i2p163-177.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: an Analysis Using Panel Data

Author

Listed:
  • Artur Morgado
  • Julio Pindado

Abstract

We study the relationship between firm value and investment to test the underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses. The results obtained, using panel data methodology as the estimation method, indicate that the abovementioned relation is quadratic, which implies that there exists an optimal level of investment. As a consequence, firms that invest less than the optimal level suffer from an underinvestment problem, while those investing more than the optimum suffer from overinvestment. The quadratic relation is maintained when firms are classified depending on their investment opportunities, the optimum being in accordance with the quality of investment opportunities.

Suggested Citation

  • Artur Morgado & Julio Pindado, 2003. "The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: an Analysis Using Panel Data," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 9(2), pages 163-177, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:9:y:2003:i:2:p:163-177
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-036X.00214
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-036X.00214
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-036X.00214?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Sean Cleary, 1999. "The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 673-692, April.
    5. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    6. Doukas, John, 1995. "Overinvestment, Tobin's q and gains from foreign acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(7), pages 1285-1303, October.
    7. Lang, Larry & Ofek, Eli & Stulz, Rene M., 1996. "Leverage, investment, and firm growth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 3-29, January.
    8. Abimbola Adedeji, 1998. "Does the Pecking Order Hypothesis Explain the Dividend Payout Ratios of Firms in the UK?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(9-10), pages 1127-1155.
    9. Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August.
    10. de Miguel, Alberto & Pindado, Julio, 2001. "Determinants of capital structure: new evidence from Spanish panel data," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 77-99, March.
    11. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    12. Abimbola Adedeji, 1998. "Does the Pecking Order Hypothesis Explain the Dividend Payout Ratios of Firms in the UK?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(9‐10), pages 1127-1155, November.
    13. Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 169-215.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
    2. Julio Pindado & Chabela De La Torre, 2009. "Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 49(2), pages 363-383, June.
    3. Grzegorz Pawlina & Luc Renneboog, 2005. "Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 483-513, September.
    4. Serin Choi & Seoki Lee & Kyuwan Choi & Kyung-A Sun, 2018. "Investment–cash flow sensitivities of restaurant firms," Tourism Economics, , vol. 24(5), pages 560-575, August.
    5. Gayané Hovakimian, 2009. "Determinants of Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 161-183, March.
    6. Stein, Jeremy C., 2003. "Agency, information and corporate investment," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 111-165, Elsevier.
    7. Aloke Ghosh & Doocheol Moon & Kishore Tandon, 2007. "CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5‐6), pages 819-839, June.
    8. Sai Ding & Alessandra Guariglia & John Knight & Junhong Yang, 2021. "Negative Investment in China: Financing Constraints and Restructuring versus Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1411-1449.
    9. Rana El Bahsh & Ali Alattar & Aziz N. Yusuf, 2018. "Firm, Industry and Country Level Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from Jordan," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(2), pages 175-190.
    10. Delcoure, Natalya, 2007. "The determinants of capital structure in transitional economies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 400-415.
    11. Lijuan Xiao & Min Bai & Yafeng Qin & Lingyun Xiong & Lijuan Yang, 2021. "Financial Slack and Inefficient Investment Decisions in China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 920-941, June.
    12. Ferrando, Annalisa & Preuss, Carsten, 2018. "What finance for what investment? Survey-based evidence for European companies," EIB Working Papers 2018/01, European Investment Bank (EIB).
    13. Mohamed Soufeljil & Asma Sghaier & Zouhayer Mighri & Hanène Kheireddine, 2017. "The financial structure of the Tunisian listed businesses: an application on panel data," Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, Springer;UNESCO Chair in Entrepreneurship, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, December.
    14. Hovakimian, Gayane & Titman, Sheridan, 2006. "Corporate Investment with Financial Constraints: Sensitivity of Investment to Funds from Voluntary Asset Sales," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 357-374, March.
    15. Rizov, Marian, 2008. "Corporate capital structure and how soft budget constraints may affect it," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 22(4), pages 648-684.
    16. Aggarwal, Raj & Kyaw, NyoNyo Aung, 2010. "Capital structure, dividend policy, and multinationality: Theory versus empirical evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 140-150, March.
    17. Byung S. Min, 2018. "Effects of Outsider’s Monitoring on Capital Structure and Corporate Growth Strategy: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 152(2), pages 459-475, October.
    18. Krivogorsky, Victoria & Joh, Gun-Ho & DeBoskey, D.G., 2018. "The influence of supply side factors on firm's borrowing decisions: European evidence," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 202-222.
    19. Valentina Peruzzi, 2017. "Does family ownership structure affect investment-cash flow sensitivity? Evidence from Italian SMEs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(43), pages 4378-4393, September.
    20. Julio Pindado & Luis Rodrigues & Chabela Torre, 2006. "How does Financial Distress Affect Small Firms’ Financial Structure?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 377-391, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:9:y:2003:i:2:p:163-177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efmaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.