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Partial privatization and yardstick competition

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  • V. Bhaskar
  • Bishnupriya Gupta
  • Mushtaq Khan

Abstract

We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, but this excess was substantially eroded by the end of the period we studied. The extent of erosion differs between white‐collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. Our findings suggest that partial privatization increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, because heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers, and also makes excess employment more transparent to the general public.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Bhaskar & Bishnupriya Gupta & Mushtaq Khan, 2006. "Partial privatization and yardstick competition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 14(3), pages 459-477, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:14:y:2006:i:3:p:459-477
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2006.00265.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Zheng Wang & John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2020. "Optimal mixed ownership: A contract view," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(1), pages 45-68, January.
    2. Yan, Qingyou & Yang, Le, 2018. "Optimal licensing schemes for a mixed ownership firm when facing uncertain R&D outcomes and technology spillover," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 550-572.
    3. Kevin Amess & Jun Du & Sourafel Girma, 2009. "Full and Partial Privatization in China: The Labor Consequences," Discussion Papers 09/11, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    4. John Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2010. "Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 101(3), pages 231-246, November.
    5. Sara Biancini, 2010. "Incomplete Regulation, Competition, and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(6), pages 1003-1026, December.
    6. Gelves, Juan Alejandro & Heywood, John S., 2016. "How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 278-284.

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