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A Tax Evasion Model with Allowance for Retroactive Penalties

Author

Listed:
  • J. A. RICKARD
  • A. M. RUSSELL
  • T. D. HOWROYD

Abstract

Discrete models of tax evasion are considered when evasion has occurred over a period of several years. Allowance is made for growth in income, investment of illicit gains from successful evasion, and the imposition of retroactive penalties. Retroactive penalties increase deterrence of evasion if introduced at a point where evasion has been continuing for some years, since the utility gain from continuing successful evasion is unaffected, whereas the utility loss will be increased regardless of attitude to risk. Prohibitive penalty rates are determined, and a range of penalty rates are given in which some dishonest taxpayers may become honest. The formulation of the basic model and consequent conclusions are relevant to the current Australian taxation scene.

Suggested Citation

  • J. A. Rickard & A. M. Russell & T. D. Howroyd, 1982. "A Tax Evasion Model with Allowance for Retroactive Penalties," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 58(4), pages 379-385, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:58:y:1982:i:4:p:379-385
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1982.tb00389.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:ecorec:v:55:y:1979:i:150:p:267-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Geoffrey Fishburn, 1979. "On How to Keep Tax Payers Honest (or almost so)," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(3), pages 267-270, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. James Alm & James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2020. "Audit State Dependent Taxpayer Compliance: Theory And Evidence From Colombia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 819-833, April.
    2. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    3. Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
    4. Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July.
    5. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.

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