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Local Benefit‐Seeking In The Legislature: An Investigation Of Congressional Staffing Decisions

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  • Mark A. Zupan

Abstract

In prior work, I proposed a prisoner's dilemma theory for the partisan pattern that political ticket splitting has taken in the United States: where Republicans, since 1932, have done consistently better in races for the White House than in contests for Congressional seats. The theory relies on the key assumption that Democratic legislative representatives are more willing to engage in local benefit‐seeking. By examining the personal staffing decisions made by members of the House this paper provides some empirical support for such an assumption. Relative to their Republican counterparts, Democratic legislators both hire more personal staff and allocate a higher percentage of the staff hired to district rather than Washington offices.

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  • Mark A. Zupan, 1991. "Local Benefit‐Seeking In The Legislature: An Investigation Of Congressional Staffing Decisions," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 163-176, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:163-176
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00045.x
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    1. Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "Local Benefit-Seeking and National Policymaking: Democrats vs. Republicans in the Legislature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 245-258, January.
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