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A Political-Economic Account of Global Tariffs

Author

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  • Kishore Gawande
  • Pravin Krishna
  • Marcelo Olarreaga

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12056-abs-0001"> The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection-for-sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.

Suggested Citation

  • Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2015. "A Political-Economic Account of Global Tariffs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 204-233, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:204-233
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecpo.2015.27.issue-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Crivelli, Pramila, 2016. "Regionalism and falling external protection in high and low tariff members," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 70-84.
    2. Lake, James & Roy, Santanu, 2017. "Are global trade negotiations behind a fragmented world of “gated globalization”?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 117-136.
    3. Neha Bhardwaj Upadhayay, 2020. "Uncovering the proliferation of contingent protection through channels of retaliation, gender and development assistance," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph20-02 edited by Julie Lochard & Catherine Bros.
    4. Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2016. "Optimization of government trade behavior and its implication for small developing economy (the case of Ukraine)," MPRA Paper 71983, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Cole, Matthew T. & Lake, James & Zissimos, Ben, 2021. "Contesting an international trade agreement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    6. Pramila Crivelli & Luca Rubini, 2019. "“Flying High in a Plane” Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (WT/DS316/AB/RW)," RSCAS Working Papers 2019/78, European University Institute.
    7. Sajal Lahiri & Peri Silva, 2016. "Potential Pareto-Improving Move Toward Most Favored Nation Tariffs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1086-1104, April.
    8. Saha, Amrita, 2019. "Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
    9. Kuenzel, David J., 2017. "WTO dispute determinants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-179.
    10. Vivienne Born & Lee Warren Brown & Dinesh Hasija, 2024. "Who obtains political exemptions? An attention-based analysis of steel tariff exclusion requests," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(2), pages 166-180, June.
    11. Olena Sokolovska & Dmytro Sokolovskyi, 2017. "Efficient Government Trade Behavior and Its Implication for Small Developing Economy: The Case of Ukraine," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 64-81.

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