IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v1y1989i2p97-117.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Optimal Tax Treatment Of Leviathan

Author

Listed:
  • John Douglas Wilson

Abstract

This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a “benevolent planner,” who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a “Leviathan planner,” who places more weight on the utilities of “favored consumers.” The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare‐improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing all commodities.

Suggested Citation

  • John Douglas Wilson, 1989. "An Optimal Tax Treatment Of Leviathan," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 97-117, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:97-117
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00007.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00007.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00007.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April.
    2. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms," Working Papers 2008-5, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    3. Massimo Bordignon, 2015. "Exit and Voice: Yardstick Versus Fiscal Competition Across Governments," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 1(1), pages 117-137, March.
    4. Wilson, John Douglas, 2005. "Welfare-improving competition for mobile capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
    5. Evrenk Haldun, 2009. "A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, December.
    6. Shimaa Elkomy & Graham Cookson, 2020. "Performance Management Strategy: Waiting Time in the English National Health Services," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 95-112, March.
    7. Eggert, Wolfgang & Sørensen, Peter Birch, 2008. "The effects of tax competition when politicians create rents to buy political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1142-1163, June.
    8. Dwight R. Lee & Arthur Snow, 1997. "Political Incentives and Optimal Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(5), pages 491-508, September.
    9. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    10. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2004.
    11. Dulleck, Uwe & Wigger, Berthold U., 2015. "Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 106-116.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:97-117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.