IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v15y2003i3p225-246.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Educational Policy: Egalitarian or Elitist?

Author

Listed:
  • Herschel I. Grossman
  • Minseong Kim

Abstract

This paper uses a general‐equilibrium model of production and predation to explain observed differences across countries in educational policies. This model predicts, in accord with the facts, that countries in which the government is willing and able to enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to guarding against predators choose to have egalitarian educational policies, which serve to decrease the amount of guarding required to deter predation. In contrast, countries in which individual producers, or small subsets of producers, choose the amount of resources to allocate to guarding against predators, taking the ratio of predators to producers as given, choose to have elitist educational policies, which can serve to decrease the number of potential predators.

Suggested Citation

  • Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 2003. "Educational Policy: Egalitarian or Elitist?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 225-246, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:225-246
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00123
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00123
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-0343.00123?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
    2. Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 2002. "Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(3), pages 393-407, September.
    3. José De Gregorio & Jong-Wha Lee, 1999. "Education and Income Distribution: New Evidence from Cross-country Data," Documentos de Trabajo 55, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1996. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 10(3), pages 565-591, September.
    5. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
    6. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-712, June.
    7. Dan Usher, 1997. "Education as a Deterrent to Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 367-384, May.
    8. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    9. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284.
    10. Juan Mendoza, 2015. "The protection of private property: the government as a free-rider," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 179-205, May.
    11. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
    12. Usher, D, 1987. "Theft as a Paradigm for Departures from Efficiency," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 235-252, June.
    13. Grossman, Herschel I., 1995. "Robin hood and the redistribution of property income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-410, September.
    14. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    15. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 249-262.
    16. Grossman, Herschel I. & Kim, Minseong, 2000. "Predators, moral decay, and moral revivals," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 173-187, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leite, Duarte N. & Afonso, Óscar & Silva, Sandra T., 2020. "The Two Revolutions, Landed Elites, And Education During The Industrial Revolution," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(6), pages 1478-1511, September.
    2. López Cruz, Iván G., 2019. "Policing, schooling and human capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 572-597.
    3. Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, 2010. "Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-67, March.
    4. Mejia, Daniel & Posada, Carlos-Esteban, 2007. "Populist policies in the transition to democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 932-953, December.
    5. Helmuth Cremer & Philippe Donder & Pierre Pestieau, 2010. "Education and social mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(4), pages 357-377, August.
    6. Dominic Rohner, 2010. "From rags to rifles: deprivation, conflict and the welfare state," IEW - Working Papers 463, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Nils‐Petter Lagerlöf & Thomas Tangerås, 2008. "From rent seeking to human capital: a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 760-780, August.
    8. Grossman, Herschel I., 2005. "Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 269-285, June.
    9. Fali Huang, 2012. "Why Did Universities Precede Primary Schools? A Political Economy Model Of Educational Change," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 418-434, April.
    10. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2006. "Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(1), pages 85-117.
    11. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 2004. "The evolution of modern educational systems: Technical vs. general education, distributional conflict, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 559-582, April.
    12. Vincenzo Prete & Claudio Zoli, 2019. "The political economy of educational policies and inequality of opportunity," Working Papers 2019:14, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    13. Joanna Alexopoulos & Tiago V. Cavalcanti, 2010. "Cheap home goods and persistent inequality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(3), pages 417-451, December.
    14. Hao Jin & Hewei Shen, 2020. "Foreign Asset Accumulation among Emerging Market Economies: a Case for Coordination," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 35, pages 54-73, January.
    15. Rohner, D., 2007. "From Rags to Rifles: The Economics of Deprivation, Conflict and Welfare State," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0771, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Ivan G. Lopez Cruz, 2015. "Policing, Schooling and Human Capital Accumulation," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-024, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    17. Hai-Anh H. Dang & Paul W. Glewwe, 2018. "Well Begun, but Aiming Higher: A Review of Vietnam’s Education Trends in the past 20 Years and Emerging Challenges," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 1171-1195, July.
    18. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series 538, CESifo.
    19. Boschini, Anne D., 2006. "The political economy of industrialisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 887-907, December.
    20. Fujii, Dmitri, 2009. "Who Wants To Be a Genius?," Panorama Económico, Escuela Superior de Economía, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, vol. 0(09), pages 7-54, segundo s.
    21. Gonzalez, M. & Wen, W., 2007. "The Supply of Social Insurance," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0772, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    22. Vogel, Edgar, 2011. "Human Capital and the Demographic Transition: Why Schooling Became Optimal," MEA discussion paper series 11247, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 1998. "Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy," NBER Working Papers 6403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kolmar, Martin, 2005. "The contribution of Herschel I. Grossman to political economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 802-814, December.
    3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    4. Aysan, Ahmet Faruk, 2005. "The Role of Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions on Redistribution: An Empirical Assessment," MPRA Paper 17773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 2002. "Education, Social Cohesion, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1192-1204, September.
    6. Eiji Yamamura & Inyong Shin, 2009. "Effects of Income Inequality on Growth through Efficiency Improvement and Capital Accumulation," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 237-258.
    7. Easterly, William, 2001. "The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 317-335, December.
    8. Easterly, William, 2007. "Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 755-776, November.
    9. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    10. Fletcher, Erin K. & Iyigun, Murat, 2009. "Cultures, Clashes and Peace," IZA Discussion Papers 4116, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Aysan, Ahmet Faruk, 2005. "The Shadowing Role of Redistributive Institutions in the Relationship Between Income Inequality and Redistribution," MPRA Paper 17772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Gradstein, Mark, 2003. "Governance and economic growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3098, The World Bank.
    13. Herschel I. Grossman, 1998. "Producers and Predators," Working Papers 98-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    14. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Governance and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 505-518, April.
    15. Christophe Ehrhart, 2009. "The effects of inequality on growth: a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature," Working Papers 107, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    16. Grossman, Herschel I. & Kim, Minseong, 2002. "Is a moral disposition rewarded?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1811-1820, September.
    17. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2010. "The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 329-358, May.
    18. Gerring, John & Thacker, Strom C. & Lu, Yuan & Huang, Wei, 2015. "Does Diversity Impair Human Development? A Multi-Level Test of the Diversity Debit Hypothesis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 166-188.
    19. Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, 2020. "The Economics of Language," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 348-404, June.
    20. Usman Khalid & Mohammad Amin, 2023. "The impact of ethnic fractionalisation on labor productivity: Does firm size matter?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(7), pages 2213-2249, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:225-246. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.