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Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers?

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  • Otto H. Swank
  • Robert A. J. Dur

Abstract

Using a simple game‐theoretical model, this paper analyzes the role of policy advisers in the policy‐making process. We show that policy makers are inclined to appoint advisers whose preferences coincide with their own preferences. Furthermore, we show that policy makers are biased towards erecting permanent advisory units. This result stems from the policy makers' desire to affect the actions of their successors. A permanent advisory unit induces future policy makers to act in accordance with the preferences of current policy makers. The policy‐makers' bias towards erecting permanent advisory units may drive a wedge between actual policy outcomes and socially desired policy outcomes.

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  • Otto H. Swank & Robert A. J. Dur, 2001. "Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 73-94, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:73-94
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00084
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    Cited by:

    1. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
    2. Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2013. "Fiscal restraints by advisors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-232, August.
    3. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
    4. Sangwon Park, 2013. "Separation of Two Agencies for Fiscal Policies," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 351-377.
    5. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    6. Magnus Henrekson & Anders Kärnä & Tino Sanandaji, 2022. "Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: coveted by policymakers but impervious to top-down policymaking," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 867-890, July.
    7. Hwang, In Do & Lustenberger, Thomas & Rossi, Enzo, 2021. "Does communication influence executives’ opinion of central bank policy?☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    8. Edomah, Norbert & Foulds, Chris & Jones, Aled, 2017. "Policy making and energy infrastructure change: A Nigerian case study of energy governance in the electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 476-485.

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