Retests on the Theory of Collective Action: The Olson and Zeckhauser Model and its Elaboration

The Olson‐Zeckhauser model explaining contributions to international organizations, which used economic size as the dominant indicator, lost its predictive power by the 1970s. I suggest a broad explanatory factor: contribution incentives experienced by an organization's members. International relations theory enables us to identify systemic reasons why the large industrialized nations might feel less incentive to contribute to international governmental organizations regardless of their policy area. The reasons, changing characteristics of the international system including multipolarity and international economic competition, have intensified since the early 1970s in step with changing contribution patterns. I propose an empirical model, a specific incarnation of the collective‐action framework. This proposed model argues that a state's burden‐sharing reflects the nature of its international preferences, themselves a function of a country's domestic conditions and international incentives. A variety set of tests supports my hypothesis that the decreasing interest of large nations in bankrolling international institutions arises from the increasingly decentralized nature of international influence.