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Signalling, Inequality and the Social Structure

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  • Ana M. Ferrer

Abstract

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market. A signalling game is analysed, in which education, acting as a signalling good, determines one's position in society. The economy's degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is 'aristocratic', where high income is the source of social standing, or 'meritocratic', bestowing status on high ability. Each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2005.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana M. Ferrer, 2005. "Signalling, Inequality and the Social Structure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(3), pages 515-529, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:515-529
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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Thomas, 2013. "What price makes a good a status good? Results from a mating game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 35-55, August.
    2. Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human capital investment, Signaling, and Wage differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

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