IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econom/v65y1998i260p535-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence

Author

Listed:
  • Pudney, Stephen
  • Galassi, Francesco L
  • Mealli, Fabrizia

Abstract

The authors estimate a discrete-choice model of farm tenures in fifteenth-century Florence using data in the form of an unbalanced panel, with individual farms nested within landlords' total property holdings. The probabilities of wage, rental, and sharecropping tenures are estimated, allowing for landlord-specific random effects. Specification tests are used to validate the model. The authors' results emphasize the role of long-lived fixed assets (vines), vulnerable to damage by short-term over-production, as a factor favoring sharecropping (which 'taxes' overproduction). However, they find evidence against theories emphasizing high monitoring costs as an influence favoring rental contracts. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Suggested Citation

  • Pudney, Stephen & Galassi, Francesco L & Mealli, Fabrizia, 1998. "An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 535-556, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:535-56
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Partha Deb & Furio Rosati, 2002. "Determinants of Child Labor and School Attendance: The Role of Household Unobservables," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 02/9, Hunter College Department of Economics.
    2. Bartolucci, Francesco & Bacci, Silvia & Pigini, Claudia, 2017. "Misspecification test for random effects in generalized linear finite-mixture models for clustered binary and ordered data," Econometrics and Statistics, Elsevier, vol. 3(C), pages 112-131.
    3. Francesco BARTOLUCCI & Silvia BACCI & Claudia PIGINI, 2015. "A Misspecification Test for Finite-Mixture Logistic Models for Clustered Binary and Ordered Responses," Working Papers 410, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    5. Fukunaga, Keita & Hueth, Brent, 2006. "Contractual Externalities and Contract Design -Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21368, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Partha Deb, 2001. "A discrete random effects probit model with application to the demand for preventive care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(5), pages 371-383, July.
    7. Stephen Pudney, "undated". "Pay Differentials, Discrimination and Worker Grievances," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/5, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    8. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    9. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
    10. Eugene N. White, 2004. "From privatized to government‐administered tax collection: tax farming in eighteenth‐century France," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 57(4), pages 636-663, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:535-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.